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It is election day. On your way to work, you stop at your local 
polling place to cast your vote. When you enter the room, however, an 
election official demands to see your driver’s license. Because you 
cannot afford a car, you do not have a driver’s license. You try to 
explain this to the election official, who, despite your pleas, notifies 
you that you cannot vote today without one. Moreover, he tells you 
that to vote in the future you must obtain a government-issued photo 
ID. You understand that such an ID costs money, of which you have 
very little. Understandably, you would prefer to spend that money on 
the necessities of life. Helpless, you leave the polling place, 
discouraged that voting has become a luxury you can no longer afford.  
 In 2005, the Indiana legislature passed a law which will lead to 
just this type of scenario, requiring government-issued photo 
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identification at the polls.1 To most voters, this might seem like a 
harmless requirement that imposes a minimal burden on our right to 
vote. However, for the indigent, elderly, and disabled, who often lack 
both the need for government-issued identification and the means to 
obtain it, the Indiana “Photo ID Law” presents a major obstacle to the 
right to vote.2 Nonetheless, in its January 2007 decision of Crawford v. 
Marion County Election Board, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit upheld Indiana’s Photo ID Law. 3 In doing so, the 
Seventh Circuit has eroded protection of the right to vote and has 
started down a dangerous path. 
In Crawford, a divided court, led by Judge Posner, misapplied the 
legal test articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Burdick v. 
Takushi.4 In effect, the majority’s interpretation of Burdick threatens to 
eliminate strict scrutiny review of voting rights cases altogether, in 
contradiction of the plain language of the Burdick decision.5 Such an 
interpretation is far too deferential to state legislatures, and limits the 
court’s ability to ensure that state voting legislation complies with the 
Constitution. 
This Comment will demonstrate that the Seventh Circuit erred in 
its interpretation of Burdick and incorrectly upheld a statute that 
violates the constitutional rights of many Indiana voters. Section I will 
describe the context in which the Seventh Circuit decided Crawford. 
Section II will recount the course of the Crawford litigation, including 
a description of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in that case and the 
court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc. Finally, 
Section III will discuss why the Seventh Circuit misapplied Burdick 
and the impact of this decision.  
 
 
                                                 
1 See Ind. Code §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1 (2005). 
2 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
3 Id. at 954. 
4 See 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952-53. 
5 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952. 
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I. CONTEXT OF THE CRAWFORD DECISION 
 
A. The Voting Rights Act and HAVA 
 
In 1965, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) in 
response to widespread state practices that denied voting rights to 
racial minorities.6 In effect, the VRA affirms the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s protection of voting rights.7 The VRA outlawed such 
discriminatory practices as literacy tests and poll taxes.8 The reach of 
the VRA, however, extends beyond overt discrimination, prohibiting 
as well practices that diminish the voting power of minorities.9 Such 
“vote dilution” includes gerrymandering districts, annexing of outlying 
areas with predominantly white populations, and replacing elected 
officials with appointed officials.10 Both cases of vote denial and vote 
dilution fall under the rubric of Section II of the VRA.11 
The Supreme Court elaborated the requirements to bring a 
successful Section II case in White v. Regester.12 In White, the Court 
held that plaintiffs could prevail on a Section II challenge to an 
electoral system without directly proving that government decision-
                                                 
6 See Allen v State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969); Daniel P. 
Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 
57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 702 (2006); Pasquale A. Cipollone, Comment, Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act and Judicial Elections: Application and Remedy, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 733, 736 (1991). 
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1, 2 (“The right of citizens of the United 
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of involuntary servitude); Lopez v 
Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 269 (1999). 
8 Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(b), 1973(h) (1965). 
9 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 703. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 692. 
12 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973), vacated by White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935 
(1975). 
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makers acted with discriminatory intent.13 The Court reversed course, 
however, in the case of Mobile v. Bolden.14 In Mobile, a plurality of 
the Supreme Court required a plaintiff bringing a Section II claim to 
prove intentional discrimination.15 
Mobile involved an at-large election scheme for the city 
commissioners of Mobile, Alabama.16 Under that scheme, all voters in 
Mobile elected each of the commissioners.17 Because whites were a 
numerical majority in Mobile, they were able to form a “bloc” to shut 
blacks out of the commission.18 Accordingly, the minority citizens of 
Mobile sued the commission as a class, alleging that the at-large 
scheme violated the VRA, among other allegations.19 The Court 
disagreed with the minority citizens, holding that it would find an 
electoral system unconstitutional only upon direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent.20 
Congress amended the VRA in 1982, in direct response to Mobile, 
to adopt the “results test” applied in White.21 Under this test, a plaintiff 
could establish a Section II violation by demonstrating discriminatory 
effects alone, without any showing of discriminatory intent.22 This 
remains the applicable test for Section II violations of the VRA today. 
                                                 
13 See id.; Michael J. Pitts, Congressional Enforcement of Affirmative 
Democracy Through Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 5 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 185, 
204 (2005). 
14 See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting 
Rights Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973b, as recognized in Hayden v. Pataki, 449 
F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006). 
15 Mobile, 446 U.S. at 65. 
16 Id. at 58. 
17 Id. at 60. 
18 See Br. of Appellant at 21-22, Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (No. 
77-1844), 1977 U.S. Briefs 1844; Tokaji, supra note 6, at 704. 
19 Mobile, 446 U.S. at 58. 
20 See id. at 57. 
21 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1985). 
22 Id.; see also Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a), (b) (whereas the 
original version of § 2 mirrored the Fifteenth Amendment, barring practices that 
deny or abridge the vote on account of race, the amended version provides: “no 
4
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Although the VRA protected the individual right to vote, after the 
tumultuous 2000 presidential election and the case of Bush v. Gore it 
became clear that new measures were needed to ensure the fairness of 
U.S. elections.23 This concern led to the passing of the Help America 
Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”).24 HAVA set general minimum election 
standards, including a limited requirement that voters present 
identification in the form of a photo ID, current utility bill, bank 
statement, or government check.25 HAVA also set standards for voting 
equipment, voter registration, and created the Election Assistance 
Commission to help implement the act.26 However, aside from these 
minimum standards, HAVA left the details of election administration 
to the states.27 
 
B. Georgia and Indiana Enact Strict Photo ID Requirements 
 
From the electoral scrutiny that followed the 2000 presidential 
elections arose a variety of election reform measures across the 
country.28 While some legislators have aimed their efforts at fraud 
prevention and electoral security, others have focused on the burden 
                                                                                                                   
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall 
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results 
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color. . .”) (emphasis added). 
23 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 693-95; see generally 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per 
curiam). 
24 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 693-95; see generally 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per 
curiam). 
25 Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 15483(b) (LEXIS 2002) (requiring 
certain forms of identification for first-time voters who registered by mail after 
January 1, 2003). 
26 See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: 
Discretion, Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1206 (2005). 
27 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 696. 
28 See id. at 689-90 (such measures include ballot security laws, voting 
machine requirements, standards for recounts and election contests, and absentee 
voting standards). 
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such security measures impose on minority voters.29 These two 
conflicting viewpoints reflect a fundamental “tension between access 
and integrity” in elections, with liberals typically favoring access to 
the polls and conservatives favoring electoral integrity.30 
The “integrity” side of this debate has prevailed in two states: 
Indiana and Georgia. Both states enacted laws more strict than the 
HAVA minimum standards, requiring voters to present government-
issued photo identification at the polls to address legislative concerns 
about election fraud.31 The Photo ID law specifically provides:  
 
(1) [If a] voter is unable or declines to present the proof 
of identification; or (2) a member of the precinct 
election board determines that the proof of 
identification presented by the voter does not qualify as 
proof of identification under IC 3-5-2-40.5, a member 
of the precinct election board shall challenge the 
voter.32 
 
A document satisfies the “proof of identification” requirement if it 
shows the “name of the individual to whom the document was issued, 
and the name conforms to the name in the individual’s voter 
registration record.”33 A voter who lacks the required identification 
may cast a provisional ballot, in which case the voter has ten days 
either to file an affidavit of indigency or to procure the required 
identification.34 The Photo ID Law exempts voters who submit 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 695. 
31 Ind. Code §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1; Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-417 
(2007) (enforcement enjoined by Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 
2d 1294, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2006)); Robert Berman, Voting Rights Section, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum, at 5 (Aug. 25, 2005), available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/dojgadocs1_11.pdf. 
32 Ind. Code §§ 3-5-2-7.2. 
33 Ind. Code § 3-5-2-40.5. 
34 Ind. Code §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1; Crawford v. Marion 
County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 950 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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absentee ballots or voters who live in nursing homes from complying 
with the photo ID requirement.35 
Georgia’s photo identification law is very similar, demanding a 
government-issued photo ID for access to the polls.36 Like the Indiana 
Photo ID Law, the Georgia law also allows voters without sufficient 
identification to cast a provisional ballot, which election officials will 
count only if they are able to verify that the voter is “eligible and 
entitled to vote.”37 However, in many respects, the Georgia law is less 
severe than the Indiana Photo ID Law. For example, the Georgia law 
allows almost anyone to vote via absentee ballot, providing an 
alternative to the in-person photo ID requirement.38 Furthermore, the 
Georgia law allows voters to obtain a voter identification card, which 
would satisfy the photo ID requirement, without charge.39 Yet, the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia found that even this 
law exceeded constitutional bounds, and it granted an injunction 
preventing its enforcement.40 This decision left the Indiana Photo ID 
Law alone as the strictest photo ID requirement in the country. 
While other states have enacted laws that require identification at 
the polls, none have enacted any as harsh as the Indiana or Georgia 
laws. For example, Arizona requires voters to present a photo ID or 
two forms of non-photo identification, such as a current utility bill.41 A 
similar law exists in Ohio, where voters must present a state-issued 
photo ID, a military ID, or a non-photo ID with the voter’s name and 
current address.42 Notably, however, the Arizona and Ohio laws allow 
those without government-issued photo identification to prove their 
                                                 
35 Ind. Code §§ 3-11-8-25.1(e); 3-11-10-1.2. 
36 See Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-417 (2007). 
37 Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-419 (2007). 
38 Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-380(b) (2007). 
39 Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-417.1(a) (2007). 
40 Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 
2006). 
41 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-579 (2007); Tokaji, supra note 6, at 699-700. 
42 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 699-700; H.B. 3, 126th Gen. Assem., sec. 3501.19, 
2006 Ohio Legis. Bull. 75 (LexisNexis), available at 2005 Ohio HB 3 (LexisNexis). 
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identity through other means. No such safety valve exists for voters 
without the requisite photo identification in Indiana or Georgia. 
 
C. Burdick v. Takushi:  
A Flexible Standard of Review For Voting Rights Legislation 
 
The U.S. courts have long recognized voting as a fundamental 
right.43 Historically, they have applied strict scrutiny to any state 
limitation on voting rights, meaning such a limitation must be 
narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.44 
The Supreme Court, however, began to soften its stance in the early 
1980’s, beginning with the case of Anderson v. Celebrezze.45  
In that case, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, overturned 
an Ohio statute requiring presidential candidates to file a statement of 
candidacy.46 The plaintiff, an independent candidate running for 
president, complied with all federal registration requirements.47 
However, he failed to file a statement of candidacy in Ohio and certain 
other states by those states’ statutory deadlines.48 The Court was 
especially concerned that Ohio’s statute required filing by an early 
deadline.49 In fact, while the major party nominations had only just 
begun, and the major parties were still five months away from 
choosing their candidates, Ohio required filing of a candidacy 
statement.50  
Although the Court ultimately struck down the Ohio statute, it 
announced a two-step test for election cases, in favor of the strict 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
44 See, e.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 
184 (1979); American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780-81 (1974); Storer v. 
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974). 
45 See 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
46 Id. at 782, 806. 
47 Id. at 782. 
48 Id. 
49 See id. at 790-91. 
50 Id. 
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scrutiny approach: “consider the character and magnitude of the 
asserted injury” to the plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, then “identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by 
the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.”51 In 
applying this test, the Court required judges to “determine the 
legitimacy and strength of each of those interests,” and “consider the 
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the 
plaintiff’s rights.”52 
Nine years later, the Supreme Court decided Norman v. Reed. At 
issue in Norman was a complex statutory scheme limiting ballot 
access for new political parties in the Chicago area through various 
means.53 Taking into account the Court’s concern about limitations on 
ballot access, Justice Souter, writing for the majority, tempered the 
Court’s holding in Anderson by stating that strict scrutiny may still 
apply to any law that imposes a “severe” restriction on the right to 
vote.54 
The same year the Supreme Court decided Norman came the case 
of Burdick. The Burdick case arose out of a Hawaii law that prohibited 
voters from “write-in” voting, in which a person votes for a person not 
listed on the ballot.55 In 1986, only one candidate appeared on the 
ballot for a Hawaii House of Representatives seat in the Plaintiff’s 
district.56 Feeling that he could not adequately express his preferences 
                                                 
51 Id. at 789. 
52 Id. (the Court ultimately found that the Ohio statute placed too great a 
burden on the freedom of choice and association of voters, and violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments). 
53 See 502 U.S. 279, 282-84 (1992) (Ballot access for new parties required 
25,000 signatures on the party’s nominating petition. If a party gained at least 5% of 
the vote in the next election, that party would become “established,” and thus exempt 
from the signature requirement. However, the statute considered parties established 
only in the political subdivisions in which they had fielded candidates. For instance, 
an established party in Chicago would not necessarily be established in the greater 
Cook County area).  
54 See id. at 288-89. 
55 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992). 
56 Id. 
9
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with only one candidate on the ballot, the Plaintiff, Alan Burdick, 
asked state officials if he could submit a write-in vote.57 The Hawaii 
Attorney General sent Burdick a letter stating that Hawaii law did not 
allow such votes.58 Burdick sued Takushi, the Director of Elections for 
Hawaii, and claimed that Hawaii’s refusal to allow write-in votes 
violated his First Amendment right to self-expression and 
association.59 
Before the U.S. Supreme Court, Burdick argued that because 
voting is a fundamental right, any laws restricting that right must be 
subject to strict scrutiny.60 A divided Court disagreed.61 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Rehnquist denied that any absolute right to vote ever 
existed.62 He reasoned that states have the right to regulate elections to 
ensure that they are “fair, honest, and orderly.”63 In effect, applying 
strict scrutiny to all voting rights cases would end voting regulation 
altogether, leading to chaos at the polls.64 
Following this reasoning, Justice Rehnquist outlined a more 
flexible balancing test to determine when strict scrutiny should apply 
to cases involving the right to vote:  
 
A court considering a challenge to a state election law 
must weigh “the character and magnitude of the 
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to 
vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by 
the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its 
                                                 
57 Id.  
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 See id. at 432. 
61 See id. at 433. 
62 See id. 
63 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (“the times, places and manner of 
holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state 
by the legislature thereof”). 
64 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. 
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rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which 
those interests make it necessary to burden the 
plaintiff's rights.”65 
 
In other words, courts must weigh the burden on the right to vote 
against the stated governmental interest in enacting the legislation.66 
This, however, merely reiterated the rule elaborated in Anderson.67 
The Court proceeded to consolidate this balancing act with the “severe 
restriction” test announced in Norman.68 Justice Rehnquist explained 
that if the burden on voting rights outweighs the governmental 
interest, the regulation is classified as a “severe” restriction, and strict 
scrutiny applies.69 On the other hand, if the governmental interest 
outweighs the burden on the right to vote, the law is presumptively 
constitutional.70 
In Burdick’s case, this new test meant the death of his claim. The 
Court concluded its opinion by stating that the Hawaii prohibition on 
write-in voting was “part of an electoral scheme that provides 
constitutionally sufficient ballot access.”71 Thus, the law did not 




                                                 
65 Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)); see 
also Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992). 
66 See Burdick, 504 U.S at 434; Norman, 502 U.S. at 289. 
67 See 460 U.S. at 789. 
68 Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89. 
69 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 289) (“when [voting] 
rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn 
to advance a state interest of compelling importance’”). 
70 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788) (“If . . . the 
state law provision ‘imposes only 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’’ upon 
the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State's important 
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions”). 
71 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441. 
72 Id. 
11
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D. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups:  
The Northern District of Georgia Gets It Right 
 
Until 2006, no one had successfully challenged a photo ID 
provision under Burdick.73 However, that year, the case of Common 
Cause/Georgia v. Billups changed that. The plaintiffs in Common 
Cause included several nonprofit groups devoted to election reform, 
ethics in government, and helping minorities and the indigent.74 The 
plaintiffs asserted that Georgia’s photo ID law violated the Georgia 
Constitution, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Section II of the VRA, 
and was a poll tax in violation of the Twenty-fourth Amendment and 
the Equal Protection Clause.75 The U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia agreed, granting the plaintiffs’ request for 
preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the Georgia law.76 
As the Georgia Secretary of State informed the Georgia legislature 
and Governor before passage of an early version of the law, “the Act 
would open the door even wider to fraud in absentee balloting, while 
imposing a severe and unnecessary burden on the right to vote for 
hundreds of thousands of poor, elderly, and minority voters.”77 She 
further argued that, during her nine years as Secretary of State, there 
had been no documented cases of fraudulent voting by someone 
showing up at the polls pretending to be someone else.78  
                                                 
73 Developments in the Law: Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1144, 
1150 (2006). 
74 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1300-01. 
75 Id. at 1297; see supra text accompanying notes 36-38 for a discussion of 
Georgia’s photo ID law. 
76 Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300 (N.D. Ga. 
2006). 
77 Id. at 1304-05 (In 2005, the Georgia legislature passed the 2005 Photo-ID 
Act. In 2006, the 2006 Photo-ID Act repealed the earlier version, replacing it with 
identical photo ID requirements and a new provision requiring the Board of 
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After describing the Secretary of State’s opposition to the Georgia 
law, the court considered the plaintiffs’ evidence of harm. It first 
referred to census data indicating that minorities and the elderly were 
far less likely than white voters to have sufficient identification to vote 
under the new law.79 Plaintiffs presented additional data from the 
Secretary of State indicating the undue burden the photo ID law 
imposes on the right to vote for minorities, the elderly, and the 
disabled.80 Plaintiffs also submitted several “would-be voter” 
declarations from people asserting that the Georgia law personally 
impacted them.81  
After a detailed recount of the evidence, the court turned to the 
merits of the case. It began by restating the heavy burden that the 
plaintiffs must overcome to prevail on a motion for preliminary 
injunction.82 The court observed that to grant a preliminary injunction 
against a law passed by elected officials would be to interfere with the 
democratic process.83 Therefore, the court expressed its reluctance to 
grant such a motion, and stated that it would do so “only upon a clear 
showing that the injunction before trial is definitely demanded by the 
Constitution.”84 
Defendants argued that the Georgia photo ID requirement is not a 
severe burden because it prevents no one from voting.85 They 
                                                 
79 Id. at 1306. 
80 Id. at 1312 (“[N]early one-fourth of all registered voters aged sixty-five or 
over did not have a driver's license or Georgia ID card, and . . . 33.2 percent of 
African-American registered voters over age sixty-five did not have a license or 
Georgia ID. Nearly three-fourths of the voters who lacked driver's licenses or 
Georgia ID cards were on the active voter roll, meaning that they had voted during 
the last two election cycles). 
81 See id. at 1312-13. (Many of these people were disabled, making it difficult 
for them to travel to a registrar’s center to obtain the necessary identification; others 
lived far from a registrar’s center and simply had no way to get there). 
82 Id. at 1342-43. 
83 Id. at 1342. 
84 Id. (citing Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 
2004)). 
85 Common Cause, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1345. 
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contended that the Georgia law includes relaxed absentee voting 
requirements, allowing anyone without a photo ID to vote by absentee 
ballot.86 Moreover, the Georgia law allows voters to obtain a voter 
identification card without any fee.87 
Before addressing these arguments, the court began its analysis 
under the Burdick test. The character and magnitude of the injury, the 
district judge began, is significant because many voters who lack the 
required identification also lack the means to procure it.88 The 
evidence showed that many of the voters who the law harms are 
“elderly, infirm, or poor.”89 Such people often have no transportation 
to get to a voter registrar's office or have disabilities that prevent them 
from waiting in lengthy lines, and, therefore, cannot obtain even a free 
voter-identification card.90 The court next discounted the argument 
that any voters harmed by the law may simply cast absentee ballots. 
The state failed to publicize the new rules governing absentee ballots 
in time for the 2006 elections.91 The voting population of Georgia was 
largely unaware that it could cast absentee ballots, with no questions 
asked and without a photo ID.92 More importantly, many indigent 
voters do not have the literacy required to cast an absentee ballot, 
making this alternative unreasonable.93 
Likewise, casting a provisional ballot is an unrealistic alternative 
for many voters.94 Under the Georgia law, a person with insufficient 
identification may cast such a provisional ballot, which election 
officials will count if the person returns with a photo ID within forty-
eight hours.95 Given the difficulty in obtaining a photo ID for many 
                                                 
86 Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-380(b); Common Cause, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1345. 
87 Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-417.1(a); Common Cause, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1345. 
88 Common Cause, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1345. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1347-48. 
92 Id. 
93 See id. at 1348. 
94 See id. at 1349. 
95 Id. 
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voters, however, it is unrealistic to expect them to obtain the necessary 
identification and return to the polls within two days.96 Accordingly, 
the court found the injury to the right to vote to be “severe.”97 
Finally, the court analyzed the extent to which the State’s interest 
in preventing voter fraud makes it necessary to infringe upon the right 
to vote.98 As noted above, the Georgia Secretary of State had not seen 
a single case of voter fraud in her nine years in office.99 Although the 
defendants did produce some evidence of voter fraud, all evidence 
involved fraud in voter registration or absentee voting rather than in-
person voting.100 The district judge criticized the Georgia legislature 
for drafting a law that applies only to in-person voting, rather than 
addressing the areas where fraud is most prevalent, namely absentee 
voting and voter registration.101  
Although Georgia’s attempt at providing free voter identification 
cards was commendable, the district court ultimately found that 
Georgia’s proffered interest, preventing in-person voter fraud, was 
insufficient to justify the severe burden it imposed on the indigent, 
minorities, and disabled.102 Georgia inadequately educated the public 
about the existence of free voter-ID’s until only two weeks before the 
2006 primary elections, depriving voters of the chance to obtain them 
in time to vote.103 Accordingly, the court found that the Georgia law 
imposed an undue burden on the right to vote, in violation of the 
constitution. 
                                                 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1349-50. 




102 Id. at 1351. 
103 Id. (This seems to imply that had Georgia adequately publicized the 
opportunity for free voter identification cards, it could have avoided a constitutional 
violation). 
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The court rejected the plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the 
Georgia law constituted a constructive poll tax.104 The plaintiffs 
argued that, despite the availability of free voter-ID cards, many voters 
still had to incur the costs of transportation to a registration center.105 
In dismissing this argument, the court reasoned that these costs already 
result from voter registration and in-person voting and are merely 
“tangential burdens.”106 Ultimately, however, the district court granted 
the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction and enjoined enforcement of the 
Georgia statute for unduly burdening the right to vote.107 
 
II. THE CRAWFORD LITIGATION 
 
A. The Majority Opinion 
 
After the enactment of the Indiana Photo ID Law, several 
candidates for state office, voters, and organizations such as the 
Democratic Party and the NAACP sued various state election boards 
to enjoin enforcement of the law on the grounds that it unduly 
burdened the right to vote, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Section II of the VRA, and the Indiana Constitution.108 The district 
court granted summary judgment for the defendants.109 On appeal to 
the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner, writing for the majority in 
Crawford, disagreed with these plaintiffs.110  
He began his analysis by noting that the vast majority of Indiana 
voters have some form of government-issued photo identification, and 
that it is “exceedingly difficult to maneuver” in today’s society without 
                                                 
104 See id. at 1354-55. 
105 Id. at 1352. 
106 Id. at 1354-55 (quoting Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 
775, 827 (S.D. Ind. 2006), aff’d, 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
107 Common Cause, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1360. 
108 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 950 (7th Cir. 
2007); Br. of Appellant at 1-2, Crawford, 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-
2218, 06-2317), 2006 WL 1786073. 
109 Id. at 950. 
110 Id. at 954 (Judge Sykes joined Judge Posner in the majority opinion). 
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such identification.111 He also emphasized the relative ease with which 
most people may obtain the required photo identification, the fact that 
those who do not obtain such identification may cast a provisional 
ballot, and the fact that many registered voters do not vote anyway, all 
of which minimize the impact of the Photo ID Law.112  
Notwithstanding his clear disapproval of the plaintiffs’ argument, 
Judge Posner did concede the law harms many voters: “the benefits of 
voting to the individual voter are elusive” because of the relative 
unimportance of any single vote, and “even very slight costs in time or 
bother . . . deter many people from voting.”113 Most people who do not 
have the requisite identification, he wrote, will not go through the 
hassle of obtaining it just for the right to vote.114  
The majority proceeded to discuss the standing of the various 
plaintiffs.115 Judge Posner admitted that the vast majority of those 
harmed by the Photo ID Law will be indigent, and thus, more likely to 
vote Democratic.116 Consequently, he noted, the Photo ID Law harms 
the Democratic Party, satisfying the standing requirement.117 Finding 
standing for at least one of the plaintiffs, the majority declined to 
address the standing of the other plaintiffs.118 
Before even delving into the Burdick analysis, Judge Posner 
argued that strict scrutiny would be inappropriate in this case.119 First, 
he stated that the Photo ID Law does not actually prevent any of the 
plaintiffs from voting.120 He asserted that although “no doubt there are 
at least a few such people in Indiana” whom the law affects, the fact 
                                                 
111 Id. at 950-51. 
112 Id. at 951. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 




119 See id. at 952. 
120 Id. 
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that the law does not affect the plaintiffs themselves proves that it has 
a minimal impact.121  
Next, he argued that strict scrutiny is inappropriate where the right 
to vote is on “both sides of the ledger.”122 According to this argument, 
certain voting restrictions pit the right to vote against the state’s 
interest, such as a poll tax, where “on one side is the right to vote and 
on the other side the state’s interest in defraying the cost of elections . . 
. , or in excluding poor people or in discouraging people who are 
black.”123 Other restrictions do not pit the right to vote against the 
state’s interest.124 Judge Posner included the Photo ID Law in this 
group of restrictions.125 He argued that the purpose of the Photo ID 
Law is to prevent fraud.126 Because fraud dilutes the votes of law-
abiding voters, any measure that prevents fraud protects voting rights 
in some way.127 Thus, although this law harms the right to vote on one 
side, it protects the right to vote on the other.128 According to the 
majority, strict scrutiny should not apply to such laws.129 In other 
words, before the majority applied Burdick, it seemed the balance was 
already tipping in favor of the state. 
At last, the majority applied the Burdick test, predictably coming 
to the result that strict scrutiny does not apply to the Photo ID Law.130 
First, the majority considered the burden the law places on voting 
                                                 
121 See id. (“The fewer the people who will actually disfranchise themselves 
rather than go to the bother . . . the less of a showing the state need make to justify 
the law”); but see id. at 955 (Evans, J. dissenting) (there is some evidence that the 
Indiana Photo ID Law will make it difficult for up to four percent of Indiana’s 
eligible voters to vote). 
122 Id. at 952. 
123 Id. 
124 See id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 See id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. at 952-53. 
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rights.131 While the record from the district court provided evidence of 
this burden on many voters, the district judge found this evidence to be 
“totally unreliable” because of “methodological flaws.”132 The 
majority deferred to the district court’s finding, thus concluding that 
the burden on voting rights is slight.133 
The majority then examined the state’s interest in enacting the 
Photo ID Law.134 Judge Posner wrote that the main purpose of the 
Photo ID Law is to prevent fraud where a person “shows up at the 
polls claiming to be someone else.”135 Unless poll workers check 
photo identification of voters, Judge Posner argued, they have no way 
to prevent in-person fraud, making the law a necessity.136  
The majority then addressed several arguments by the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs first stated the current criminal penalties are a sufficient 
deterrent against vote fraud, and Indiana has prosecuted no one for 
impersonating a voter, proving the problem is too minor to warrant the 
Photo ID Law.137 The majority dismissed both arguments by asserting 
that the lack of prosecutions against fraudulent voters results from the 
difficulty of catching anyone in the act of vote fraud.138 Next, the 
majority noted that the inflated voter registration rolls of Indiana 
provide indirect evidence of voter fraud.139 Judge Posner 
acknowledged that this does not necessarily indicate the prevalence of 
fraud.140 However, he placed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs, 
stating, “plaintiffs have not shown that there are fewer impersonations 
than there are eligible voters whom the new law will prevent from 
                                                 
131 Id. at 952. 
132 Id.; see also Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 824-25 
(S.D. Ind. 2006), aff’d, 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007). 
133 Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952. 




138 See id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id.  
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voting.”141 Finally, he addressed the argument that the Photo ID Law is 
underinclusive because it does not require absentee voters to present 
ID’s.142 The majority dismissed this argument by describing the 
practical difficulties of requiring absentee voters to present photo 
identification.143  
The majority concluded by restating the principle that the states 
must retain the right to regulate elections.144 In support of this 
principle, Judge Posner revealed that he considers the burden imposed 
by the Photo ID Law “ordinary and widespread,” and that to deem 
such burdens severe would subject all electoral regulation to strict 
scrutiny.145 Finding that the burden is not severe, the majority affirmed 
the decision of the district court and upheld the Photo ID Law.146 
 
B. Judge Evans’ Dissent 
 
Judge Evans wrote a sharp dissent against the majority opinion in 
Crawford. He began abruptly: “Let's not beat around the bush: The 
Indiana voter photo ID law is a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to 
discourage election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew 
Democratic.”147 According to the dissent, the majority misapplied 
Burdick, and should have applied strict scrutiny to the Photo ID 
Law.148 
Judge Evans explained that restrictions on the right to vote are 
poor policy.149 Considering that fewer people vote now than ever, 
                                                 
141 Id. at 953-54. 
142 Id. at 954. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (“the times, places and manner of holding 
elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the 
legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such 
regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators”)). 
145 Crawford, 472 F.3d at 954. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 See id.  
149 Id. at 955. 
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states should look to increase voter participation, not restrict it.150 
While Judge Posner placed a heavy burden on the plaintiffs, Judge 
Evans placed the burden on the state to prove that the Photo ID Law is 
sufficiently necessary to warrant the harm it causes to voting rights.151 
Where the majority focused on the plaintiffs’ rather weak evidence of 
harm to indigent voters, the dissent focused instead on the state’s 
failure to provide any evidence that voter fraud is a serious problem.152 
Moreover, the dissent observed that a preliminary report to the U.S. 
Election Assistance Commission has found little evidence of in-person 
voter fraud.153 Accordingly, the dissent found no adequate justification 
for the Photo ID Law, explaining that it is not “wise to use a 
sledgehammer to hit either a real or imaginary fly on a glass coffee 
table.”154 
After finding that Indiana had an insufficient interest in enacting 
the Photo ID Law, Judge Evans explained that the ambiguous 
language of the law creates a possibility for abuse.155 As discussed in 
Section I(B) above, the name on a voter’s photo ID must “conform” to 
the name in the voter’s registration record.156 Judge Evans asked 
whether “conformity” would include the case where “the last name of 
a newly married woman is on the ID but her maiden name is on the 
registration list,” or a “name is misspelled on one—Schmit versus 
Schmitt,” or “[i]f a ‘Terence’ appears on one and a shortened ‘Terry’ 
on the other.”157 
The potential for abuse of the Photo ID Law, however, is far less 
important than the main threat of the law: stripping the right to vote 
                                                 
150 Id.  
151 See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 141. 
152 See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 953-55 (the dissent emphasized that at oral 
argument, the defendants admitted that no one in the history of Indiana had been 
charged with violating that state’s voter fraud law). 
153 Id. at 955. 
154 Id. at 955, 56 (most problems in the U.S. voting system result from 
“mismanagement, not electoral wrongdoing”). 
155 Id. 
156 Ind. Code § 3-5-2-40.5; see supra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
157 Crawford, 472 F.3d at 955. 
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from some eligible voters.158 Judge Evans conceded that he does not 
know exactly how many voters would become unable to vote because 
of the Photo ID Law; however, he alluded to some evidence that this 
could apply to 4% of eligible voters in Indiana.159 This group of 
harmed voters includes mainly the poor, elderly, minorities, and 
disabled.160 Few in this group have any need for photo identification. 
Many cannot afford a car, and therefore have no need for a driver’s 
license.161 Likewise, many cannot afford to travel, and thus have no 
need for a passport.162 Although Indiana residents may obtain an 
Indiana ID card, this requires a certified birth certificate.163 Judge 
Evans noted that for a “poor, elderly person who lives in South Bend, 
but was born in Arkansas,” the difficulty of getting a certified copy of 
a birth certificate makes this option unrealistic.164 Although Judge 
Evans agreed that it is hard to maneuver in society without a photo ID, 
as Judge Posner observed, he recognized that the indigent, elderly, and 
disabled often lack maneuverability from the beginning.165 
As Judge Evans pointed out, not all “maneuverable” citizens are 
immune from the harm this law creates.166 In fact, on the day of 
Indiana’s primary election, Representative Julia Carson, up for 
reelection in an Indianapolis district, rushed to the polling place to be 
there when it opened in the morning.167 In her haste, she took only her 
congressional identification card.168 After a poll worker informed her 
that this ID was unacceptable, she went home, picked up the required 
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photo ID, and returned.169 Representative Carson had a vested interest 
in voting that day; most people, Judge Evans noted, would not have 
made the extra trip just to vote.170  
Finally, the dissent describes its interpretation of Burdick. While 
the majority seemed to remove strict scrutiny from the voting rights 
equation entirely, Judge Evans found that Burdick left some room for 
strict scrutiny.171 Strict scrutiny enters the analysis where the burden 
on voting rights is large and the state’s justification hollow.172 
Applying that test to Crawford, Judge Evans concluded that strict 
scrutiny should apply, and the Photo ID Law imposes an undue burden 
on a specific segment of Indiana voters, violating the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.173 
 
C. The Court Disagrees About a Petition for Rehearing 
 
In April 2007, the Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ petition 
for rehearing en banc.174 Judge Wood, however, authored a dissent 
explaining her vote to grant the petition.175 The dissent worried that 
the Crawford decision left unresolved an extremely important question 
of law: “what level of scrutiny should courts use when evaluating 
mandatory voter identification laws?”176  
According to Judge Wood, the Crawford majority wrongly 
interpreted Burdick to mean that strict scrutiny never applies to 




172 Id.; see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting 
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992) (“when [voting] rights are subjected to 
‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state 
interest of compelling importance’”). 
173 Crawford, 472 F.3d at 956-57. 
174 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., Nos. 06-2218, 06-2317, 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7804, at *4 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 2007). 
175 Id. at *4 (Judges Rovner, Evans and Williams joined the dissent). 
176 Id. 
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election cases.177 In contrast, the dissent interpreted Burdick to provide 
a threshold inquiry for courts to use in determining the appropriate 
level of scrutiny.178 As stated in Burdick, the intensity of the court’s 
inquiry into an election law depends on the extent to which it harms 
the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters.179 If such a law 
imposes a “severe” burden on constitutional rights, it must be 
narrowly drawn and advance a compelling interest.180 By comparison, 
if such a law “imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of 
voters, ‘the State's important regulatory interests are generally 
sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.”181 To determine if a burden is 
“severe,” and thus whether strict scrutiny applies, courts must apply a 
balancing test, weighing the character and magnitude of harm against 
the stated governmental interest in enacting the regulation.182 
The dissent began by comparing the burden of the Photo ID Law 
on the rights of eligible voters to that of a poll tax or literacy test.183 
Strict voter identification laws can have a profound impact on voter 
turnout, with the most significant decreases in turnout among minority 
populations.184 The Crawford majority conceded that indigent voters 
are most likely to suffer the harm of the Photo ID Law and that such 
voters typically prefer Democratic candidates.185 Yet, the majority 
discounted these facts, reasoning that the Photo ID Law does not harm 
very many indigent voters; thus, the state’s interest outweighs the 
                                                 
177 Id. at 4-5. 
178 Id. at 5. 
179 Id.; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
180 Crawford, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *5-6. 
181 Id. at *6; Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 
U.S. 780, 788 (1983)). 
182 Crawford, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *6. 
183 Id. at *7. 
184 Id. (citing Christopher Drew, Low Voter Turnout is Seen in States That 
Require ID, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at 16). 
185 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
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harm caused by the law.186 The dissent disagreed, and replied that even 
if the law disenfranchises only a tiny percentage of eligible voters, this 
is certainly enough to skew election results, given the narrow margins 
of many recent elections.187 
Next, the dissent dismissed Judge Posner’s statement that “[t]he 
fewer people harmed by a law, the less total harm there is to balance 
against whatever benefits the law might confer.”188 Voting is a 
fundamental individual right, the dissent argued.189 Contrary to Judge 
Posner’s analysis, if a regulation deprives even a single voter of the 
right to vote, it can be severe.190 The dissent imagined such a case: “a 
law preventing anyone named Natalia Burzynski from voting without 
showing 10 pieces of photo identification” would still be a severe 
injury to the hypothetical Ms. Burzynski.191 Meanwhile, some 
regulations that affect very many people are perfectly reasonable, such 
as a law that prevents voters who register within 28 days of an election 
from voting in that election.192 Accordingly, the dissent argued, the 
number of people a contested regulation affects is an unreasonable 
consideration.193 
The dissent then addressed the state’s justification for the Photo 
ID Law. Whether the type of voter fraud where one person shows up at 
a polling place pretending to be another is an actual problem is a 
disputed question of fact.194 That such a genuine issue of material fact 
exists calls into question the district court’s decision to grant summary 
                                                 
186 See id., Crawford, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *7. 
187 Crawford, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *7-8. 
188 Id. at *8; see also Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952. 
189 See Crawford, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *8. 
190 Id. at *8-9. 
191 Id. 
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judgment.195 Furthermore, as the dissent observed, Burdick demands 
an inquiry into the “precise interests put forward by the State as 
justifications for the burden imposed.”196 The district court accepted 
Indiana’s claims of voter fraud as true without “any examination to see 
if they reflected reality.”197 
Finally, the dissent appeals to history, reminding the majority that 
in recent history, states have used voting regulations to discriminate 
against minorities.198 Within this context, the Photo ID Law will 
undoubtedly “harm an identifiable and often-marginalized group of 
voters to some undetermined degree.”199 While the majority was quick 
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination, the dissent 
recommended that the court should be more careful before 
disregarding such an injury.200 Judge Wood concluded by noting that 
although it would be premature to decide whether the Photo ID Law 
would survive strict scrutiny, the court should have first determined 
whether strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review before making 
its decision.201 
  
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT MISAPPLIED BURDICK AND  
REACHED THE WRONG RESULT 
 
From the tenor of the majority opinion in Crawford, it seems 
Judge Posner intuitively doubted that the Photo ID Law would cause 
any actual harm.202 This gut reaction is evident in his analysis.203 For 
                                                 
195 See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (a court will grant summary judgment where the 
evidence shows “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”). 





201 Id. at *10-11. 
202 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 950-52 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
203 See id. 
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instance, Judge Posner stated, “the new law’s requirement that the 
would-be voter present a government-issued photo ID . . . is no 
problem for people who have such a document, as most people do.”204 
He also wrote that few people will “actually disfranchise themselves 
rather than go to the bother” of obtaining an ID, revealing his doubts 
about the gravity of the plaintiffs’ claim.205 This sentence in particular 
reflects the majority’s refusal to believe that some people simply 
cannot afford the expense of acquiring a photo ID. Although ID cards 
are free in Indiana to people without a driver’s license, applicants for 
an ID card must provide certain verifying documents, such as a 
passport or certified copy of a birth certificate.206 These verifying 
documents, however, cost money.207 In fact, Indiana law demands a 
fee for a certified copy of a birth certificate.208 For indigent voters, it is 
not merely a matter of “going to the bother” to get an ID, but a matter 
of financial impossibility. 
The majority then asked about “people who do not have photo IDs 
and must vote in person, if they vote at all.”209 It seems the majority is 
implying that this law causes no actual harm because many indigent 
voters do not vote anyway. However, that many registered voters 
choose not to exercise their right to vote does not lessen the burden 
that the Photo ID Law imposes on that right. In other words, before the 
Indiana legislature enacted this law, every registered voter had the 
option to vote. Now, for many eligible voters, that option no longer 
exists. 
While the majority trivialized the impact of the Photo ID Law by 
reiterating that anyone without a valid photo ID may cast a provisional 
                                                 
204 Id. (emphasis added). 
205 Id. 
206 Ind. Code § 9-24-16-10(b) (2007); 140 Ind. Admin. Code 7-4-2 (1996) 
(provides list of required documents to obtain an ID card). 
207 See, e.g., Ind. Code § 16-37-1-9 (2007) (Local health departments 
determine the fee for a birth certificate). 
208 See id. (Although there are some exemptions from the fee requirement, 
these do not apply to people who need a birth certificate to apply for an ID card). 
209 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 950 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
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ballot, this is an unreasonable alternative for many voters.210 When 
voters cast provisional ballots, they must return to the polling place 
within ten days with a valid photo ID or an affidavit of indigency.211 
Yet, Judge Posner noted how “[t]he benefits of voting to the individual 
voter are elusive.”212 Consequently, the cost of “following up” in time 
and effort alone often outweigh the minor benefit of voting, 
disfranchising many voters.213 Considering that many indigent voters 
have great difficulty in finding transportation to a polling place, 
requiring them to return within ten days may be prohibitive.214 
Moreover, if a voter could not afford a photo ID before an election, 
she will not be able to afford one within ten days of an election.  
Likewise, indigent voters often lack education.215 It is precisely 
this group that will find executing an affidavit most difficult. For 
many, the term “affidavit” alone might be so intimidating as to 
discourage them from casting a provisional ballot. Indeed, many will 
not know what an affidavit is, how to write one, or what one requires. 
In fact, one of the requirements of an affidavit is notarization. Many 
notaries charge for their services, presenting another obstacle between 
indigent voters and the right to vote.216 For these reasons, provisional 
ballots do not sufficiently ease the burden of the Photo ID Law on 
indigent voters. 
During his Burdick analysis, Judge Posner inappropriately 
incorporated a utilitarian balancing test into the inquiry, when he 
stated, “plaintiffs have not shown that there are fewer impersonations 
than there are eligible voters whom the new law will prevent from 
                                                 
210 Id. 
211 Ind. Code §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1. 
212 Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951. 
213 See id. 
214 See Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: Proxies for Parents, 82 MINN. 
L. REV. 1463, 1521-22 (1998). 
215 See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1315-16 
(N.D. Ga. 2006). 
216 See Ind. Code § 33-42-8-1 (2007) (notaries may charge up to $2 per notarial 
act). 
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voting.”217 This is an impossible standard to impose upon the 
plaintiffs. Judge Posner described in detail the difficulty of proving 
voter fraud.218 Yet, for plaintiffs to prevail, he would require them to 
do just that, and prove that there are fewer impersonations than 
disfranchised voters.219  
Furthermore, the actual number of people harmed by the law is 
not such an important concern under Burdick. According to Judge 
Posner’s argument, the plaintiffs’ claim failed largely because the 
Photo-ID Law harms only a small group of voters.220 It seems the 
majority misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s mandate to consider the 
“character and magnitude of the asserted injury.”221 By “magnitude,” 
it is doubtful the Supreme Court meant for courts to consider the mere 
number of individuals harmed by the law.222 Voting is a fundamental 
individual right; thus, the more likely interpretation would be to 
consider the magnitude of the injury to each individual harmed.223 In 
this case, the Photo-ID Law creates an impassable barrier to the right 
to vote for many voters.224 Such a burden is undoubtedly severe to the 
individuals harmed. 
Judge Posner cited Anderson as support for his argument to 
consider the magnitude of the injury in terms of number of people 
affected.225 However, he ignored some very important language in that 
case that contradicts his interpretation. As Justice Stevens wrote, “[a]s 
our cases have held, it is especially difficult for the State to justify a 
restriction that limits political participation by an identifiable political 
                                                 
217 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953-54 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
218 Id. at 953. 
219 Id. at 953-54. 
220 Id. 
221 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
222 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., Nos. 06-2218, 06-2317, 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7804, at *8 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 2007). 
223 See id. at *8-9; supra text accompanying notes 188-92. 
224 See supra text accompanying notes 188-92. 
225 See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952. 
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group whose members share a particular viewpoint, associational 
preference, or economic status.”226 The Photo ID Law is just such a 
restriction. Although it might not harm a large percentage of Indiana’s 
population, the magnitude of the injury is large to the indigent, a group 
that shares the same economic status. Thus, Indiana should need an 
exceptionally noteworthy justification for the court to uphold the law. 
The Crawford majority ignored this, citing only the portion of the 
opinion that, out of context, supported its conclusion.  
Even within this questionable utilitarian inquiry, the majority 
erred. Inexplicably, it placed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to 
prove that the law harmed more people than it helped.227 Judge Posner 
wrote that the plaintiffs failed this test, deferring to the district court’s 
finding that the plaintiffs’ evidence of harm was too weak to 
consider.228 Even if the district court were correct in dismissing the 
plaintiffs’ evidence, however, the state provided an equally weak 
justification for the law, considering no cases of in-person voter fraud 
have been ever been filed in Indiana to date.229 Why the court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ evidence, yet gave credence to the state’s 
equally fragile evidence, was never explained by the majority.  
 Judge Posner magnified the state’s interest in enacting the Photo 
ID Law, citing indirect evidence of voter fraud in Indiana’s inflated 
voter registration rolls, which contain a discrepancy between the 
number of registered voters listed and eligible voters.230 However, 
most of this inflation results from duplicate registrations.231 Duplicate 
registrations usually result from a voter moving or dying.232 In these 
                                                 
226 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792-93 (emphasis added). 
227 See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 953-54. 
228 See id. at 952. 
229 Id. at 955; supra text accompanying notes 151-52. 
230 Crawford, 472 F.3d at 953. 
231 See Press Release, Indiana Secretary of State, U.S. Department of Justice 
Compels State Democrats to Sign off on Rokita Plan, available at 
http://www.in.gov/sos/press/2006/06222006.html (2006). 
232 See Caltech/MIT Voting Tech. Project, Voting: What Is, What Could Be 28 
(2001), available at 
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/july01/July01_VTP_Voting_Report_
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cases, voter fraud is not as great a concern.233 When people move, they 
rarely do so to commit vote fraud. Likewise, when registration lists 
contain the names of the deceased, photo ID requirements are 
unnecessary. The less restrictive means employed by most states 
would suffice to deter fraudulent use of a duplicate name.234 In fact, 
any of the forms of identification listed in HAVA would be sufficient 
to deter in-person voter fraud, and would not impose such an onerous 
burden on any group of voters.235 After all, how many people would 
go to the trouble of finding a duplicate name, then forging a utility bill 
or obtaining a fake credit card just to be able to cast a single fraudulent 
vote? 
 Furthermore, as Judge Wood reminded the majority, this entire 
proceeding involved the state’s motion for summary judgment.236 With 
such weak evidence on both sides, a genuine issue of material fact 
clearly existed, and summary judgment was inappropriate.237 Compare 
the grant of summary judgment in Crawford to the holding in Common 
Cause.238 Georgia law universally allows voters to submit absentee 
ballots, and provides for voter ID cards, without charge, to anyone in 
need of one.239 Yet, the Georgia court found that even these safeguards 
were insufficient, and the law was in clear violation of the 
constitution.240 Meanwhile, the Indiana Photo ID Law contains neither 
a liberal absentee ballot measure nor a provision for free voter ID 
                                                                                                                   
Entire.pdf (“There is little evidence that such duplicate registrations have led to 
widespread duplicate voting”). 
233 See id. 
234 See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1350 (N.D. 
Ga. 2006). 
235 See Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b) (2007). 
236 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., Nos. 06-2218, 06-2317, 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7804, at *9 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 2007). 
237 Id. 
238 See Common Cause, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1360. 
239 See supra text accompanying notes 38-39. 
240 See supra text accompanying note 82 (The plaintiffs overcame an 
extremely strict burden of proof to prevail on their motion for preliminary injunction 
against the Georgia law). 
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cards.241 Given the harsher nature of the Indiana Photo ID Law, one 
would have expected the court to deny the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment and allow the case to proceed. Nonetheless, where 
Georgia found a clear constitutional violation in a less burdensome 
law, the Seventh Circuit found that no reasonable jury could find for 
the plaintiffs, even construing all evidence in their favor.242 If the 
Seventh Circuit was correct, and no reasonable jury could have found 
a constitutional violation in Crawford, then the holding in Common 
Cause must have been quite unreasonable. 
Perhaps the majority’s most creative argument was that whenever 
the right to vote lies on “both sides of the ledger,” strict scrutiny is 
inappropriate.243 As discussed in Section II(A) above, he explained 
that with a poll tax, the government interest, be it reducing election 
costs, limiting the right to vote to those who really care, or outright 
discrimination, is set squarely against the right to vote.244 In contrast, 
the stated purpose of the Photo ID Law is to reduce voting fraud, 
which dilutes the votes of lawful voters.245 Although the Photo ID Law 
harms voting rights on one hand, it arguably preserves them on the 
other.246 
However, this “ledger” analysis has poor policy implications. Any 
reasonably creative politician could manipulate this test to avoid strict 
scrutiny for any law. For example, even a direct poll tax, which courts 
have universally found unconstitutional, can be seen in some ways as 
being on both sides of the ledger.247 If a state declares that the purpose 
                                                 
241 See supra text accompanying notes 31-35. 
242 See, e.g., Bahl v. Royal Indem. Co., 115 F.3d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(On a motion for summary judgment, courts should “review the record in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party and . . . draw all reasonable inferences in 
that party’s favor”). 
243 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
244 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 122. 
245 Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952. 
246 Id. 
247 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) 
(finding poll taxes unconstitutional). 
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of a poll tax is to preserve the integrity of elections by ensuring that 
people who actually care about politics are the ones voting, than such 
a clearly unconstitutional measure would be on “both sides of the 
ledger.” Surely, the Crawford majority would not advocate anything 
less than strict scrutiny in this case. The potential for abuse of such a 
test is clear, and the majority should not have included this inquiry in 
its Burdick analysis. 
Finally, Crawford leaves judges within the Seventh Circuit unsure 
whether, if ever, to apply strict scrutiny to cases involving electoral 
regulation.248 Under most circuits’ interpretation of Burdick, strict 
scrutiny applies to any severe regulation. To determine if a regulation 
is severe, courts weigh the harm to the right to vote against the state’s 
interest in enacting it.249 Yet, in the post-Crawford Seventh Circuit, it 
is unclear when any regulation would be severe. The majority 
complicated the Burdick test by introducing a complex utilitarian 
analysis and an unreasonable “ledger” test into the inquiry.250 This is 
likely to create confusion for courts in the future, as they grapple to 
reconcile the additional rules announced by the Seventh Circuit with 
Supreme Court precedent.251 
   
CONCLUSION: CRAWFORD’S LEGACY 
 
To paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, only a fool would sacrifice an 
essential liberty for a small amount of security.252 Yet, by restricting 
the right to vote to fight the possibly imaginary problem of in-person 
                                                 
248 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., Nos. 06-2218, 06-2317, 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7804, at *4-5 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 2007). 
249 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
250 See supra text accompanying notes 217, 243. 
251 See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792-93 (1983) (The Court 
is likely to overturn any law that limits the right to vote of an identifiable group that 
shares a “viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status.” What will a court 
do with a law that infringes on the rights of a very small group of people with similar 
economic status? To hold this law unconstitutional would obey Anderson but 
contradict Crawford). 
252 See Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231, 371 (2006). 
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voter fraud, the Indiana legislature has done just that. By upholding 
this law, the Seventh Circuit has sent the message to legislatures that 
they may enact discriminatory voting restrictions, as long as the 
restrictions harm only a small group of people.253 
The Photo ID Law is the practical equivalent of a poll tax. 
Although Indiana provides photo ID’s free of charge, applicants often 
must pay for the verifying documents needed to acquire those ID’s.254 
Although the resulting harm is less direct than with the poll taxes of 
the past, such photo ID measures often require voters to spend money 
to retain the right to vote. Those who cannot afford the expense, 
effectively lose that right. 
 To be sure, no court is likely to uphold a law that is discriminatory 
on its face. However, laws such as Indiana’s photo ID requirement 
discriminate in subtler ways. In Crawford, the Seventh Circuit has 
indicated that it will defer to states’ rights to regulate elections, and 
only in the most obvious cases will it overturn a discriminatory 
statute.255 
Under the Crawford majority’s interpretation of Burdick, strict 
scrutiny review of voting regulations would become exceedingly rare, 
if it would ever be present at all.256 According to the majority, a 
regulation is “severe” only where it harms more people than it 
purports to help.257 With a law of general applicability, such as a poll 
tax, lawmakers could argue the law helps all voters by preserving 
electoral integrity, keeping away people who have less of an interest in 
voting.258 Such a measure harms only a minority of the population, 
while purporting to help a majority. Following Judge Posner’s analysis 
closely, strict scrutiny would not apply in this case. It is doubtful that 
                                                 
253 See supra text accompanying note 216. 
254 See supra text accompanying notes 205-07. 
255 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
256 See id. at 952-54; see also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., Nos. 
06-2218, 06-2317, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7804, at *4-5 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 2007). 
257 See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 953-54. 
258 See supra text accompanying note 246. 
34
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 8
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/8
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
 
 666
the Seventh Circuit would allow this to happen with such a universally 
condemned measure. However, with a lesser-known and subtler 
discriminatory measure, the majority may defer to the states’ right to 
regulate elections.259 With this avenue open to them, political parties 
might be encouraged to think of creative ways to exclude groups that 
tend to vote against them. 
Photo ID requirements are just one of these creative methods of 
political exclusion. Contrary to the Crawford majority’s assertions, 
they can exclude enough voters to skew election results.260 For 
example, one study found that eleven percent of U.S. citizens do not 
have photo identification.261 Among those without photo ID’s, most 
tend to be poor, minorities, or disabled.262 Meanwhile, this same group 
tends to vote Democratic.263 If a photo ID requirement disfranchises 
even a fraction of the eleven percent of the population, this could 
certainly distort election results. As Judge Wood explained, merely 
hundreds of votes have decided many recent elections.264 As the states 
within the Seventh Circuit realize that subtle discriminatory measures 
might produce real political gains, such measures will only rise in 
frequency. 
                                                 
259 See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 954. 
260 Crawford, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *7-8 (citing Christopher Drew, Low 
Voter Turnout is Seen in States That Require ID, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at 16) 
(The New York Times reported that overall voter turnout in states with voter ID 
requirements decreases by about three percent, and by two to three times that much 
for minorities). 
261 Brennan Center for Justice, NYU School of Law, Citizens Without Proof: 
A Survey of Americans’ Possession of Documentary Proof of Citizenship and Photo 
Identification 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_39242.pdf (citing 
similar findings by the U.S. Department of Transportation and the U.S. Census 
Bureau). 
262 Crawford, 472 F.3d at 955. 
263 Id. at 951. 
264 Crawford 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *7-8. 
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